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Introduction
According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), it is exclusively by addressing the apparent issue of income inequality in Africa that the continent can achieve sustainable poverty reduction and progress significantly towards the attainment of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the post-2015 development agenda (UNDP, 2017) . The conclusions of the UNDP are consistent with the contemporary empirical literature. For instance, Bicaba, Brixiova and Ncube (2017) have concluded that, it is unlikely for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) to achieve the SDG threshold of reducing extreme poverty to below 3% unless inequality is addressed: "This paper examines its feasibility for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) , the world's poorest but growing region. It finds that under plausible assumptions extreme poverty will not be eradicated in SSA by 2030, but it can be reduced to low levels through high growth and income redistribution towards the poor segments of the society" (p. 93). A significant contribution to the underlying inequality in SSA is the exclusion of the female gender from the formal economic sector 3 (Efobi, Tanakem & Asongu, 2018) . While good governance is relevant in addressing female economic exclusion, existing levels of inequality can affect the effectiveness of such governance measures in the promotion of gender participation in the formal economic sector (Fosu, 2008 (Fosu, , 2009 (Fosu, , 2010a (Fosu, , 2015 Asongu & Odhiambo, 2019a) 4 . Such underpinnings motivate the positioning of this study on inequality thresholds that crowd-out the favourable effect of good governance on female economic inclusion in SSA. Having clarified the background for this research, it is relevant to critically engage and substantiate factors motivating the positioning of this study, notably: (i) the policy and scholarly concerns of inequality and gender exclusion in SSA in the light of the SDGs; (ii) the documented relevance of good governance in driving inclusive development outcomes and (iii) gaps in contemporary scholarly literature. The factors are substantiated in the same chronological order.
First, consistent with contemporary African scholarly and policy literature on inequality, inequality in SSA is a fundamental setback to sustainable development in the sub-region (McGeown, 2017; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2017; Tchamyou, 2019a Tchamyou, , 2019b . Within this framework of inequality, the concern of gender exclusion underlying this study pertains to at least two SDGs, notably: (i) SDG 5 (i.e. "achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls") and (ii) SDG 8 (i.e. "promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all"). The concern of gender exclusion is particularly relevant to SSA because females in the sub-region are the poorest in the world (Hazel, 2010) and both the scholarly and policy research on the issue are consistent on the position that women in SSA are mostly involved in small trading activities, subsistence agriculture and domestic activities that are largely always unpaid (Ellis, Blackden, Cutura, MacCulloch & Seebens, 2007; FAO, 2011; International Labour Organisation, 2013; Tandon & Wegerif, 2013; World Bank, 2015; Efobi et al., 2018) .
Second, good governance has been established to be an important channel through which economic and inclusive developments are enhanced in Africa (Efobi, 2015; Asongu & KodilaTedika, 2016; Ajide & Raheem, 2016a . Moreover, the underlying literature broadly accords on the position that appropriate and robust governance initiatives are fundamental in the driving of economic prosperity and encouragement of private sector development, which entails job opportunities for the female gender in the formal economic sector. The governance variables which are defined in the data section logically attest to the fact that political, economic and institutional dimensions of governance are relevant in providing a favourable economic atmosphere for job creation and entrepreneurship. A recent World Bank report which has estimated the loss in income from the exclusion of women in the formal economic sector at about 2.5 trillion USD, has also recommended good governance in the formulation and implementation of appropriate policies that can curtail the exclusion of women in the formal economic sector (World Bank, 2018; Nkurunziza, 2018) . The recommendations of the World Bank are taken on board in this study given that the governance channel is acknowledged and empirically engaged as a mechanism by which the participation of women in the formal economic sector can be enhanced, contingent on existing inequality levels. Moreover, the positioning of this research in light of the recommendation from the World Bank is also partly motivated by a gap in the extant literature.
Third, as far as we have reviewed, the contemporary scholarly literature on gender equality in Africa has failed to engage the relevance of good governance in promoting economic inclusion with particular emphasis on how income inequality affects the "good governance"-"female inclusion" nexus. In the attendant literature, Ntayi, Munene and Malinga (2018) provide nexuses between financial access and mobile money with emphasis on moderation from gender and social networks. As argued by Uduji and Okolo-Obasi (2018) , it is relevant to take women into consideration when implementing technology-driven policies designed to boost agricultural productivity in rural areas. Kairiza, Kiprono and Magadzire (2017) study the relationship between gender gaps and inclusive finance whereas Elu (2018) investigates the relevance of improving girls' and women's involvement in science studies. The importance of gender within informal and financial sectors is investigated by Bayraktar and Fofack (2018) while Mannah-Blankson (2018) focuses on the nexus between gender exclusion and financial access within the framework of microfinance. A strand of studies has investigated the importance of gender participation in agricultural development that is sustainable (Theriault, Smale & Haider, 2017) whereas another strand of research has been oriented towards the importance of information and communication technology (ICT) in driving female employment either directly (Efobi et al., 2018) or indirectly by means of the financial access channel (Asongu & Odhiambo, 2018a) .
Among the engaged literature, the study closest to this research is Efobi et al. (2018) who have concluded that ICT positively affects female employment in the following increasing order of magnitude: mobile phone penetration, internet penetration, and fixed broadband subscriptions.
This study departs from Efobi et al. (2018) from two main perspectives. On the one hand, contrary to the use of ICT, inequality and governance are employed as the independent variables of interest, in the light of the motivation underpinning this research. On the other, the thresholds of inequality that dampen the positive effect of good governance on female employment are provided.
Furthermore, on the latter departure from Efobi et al. (2018) , this study argues that it is not enough to provide policy makers with findings based on magnitudes of direct effects between macroeconomic variables. In essence, in order to provide policy makers with more policy options, actionable policy measures should result from the findings. To this end, this research provides critical masses of inequality that should not be exceeded if governance is to promote female economic participation.
This is an applied economics study. Hence, the authors are fully cognizant of the issues related to engaging empirics without established theoretical underpinnings. However, the authors also posit that applied economics should not exclusively be based on the premise of accepting or rejecting existing theoretical underpinnings. Accordingly, conforming to a growing branch of the literature, this research is premised on the importance of applied econometrics in theory-building (Costantini & Lupi, 2005; Narayan, Mishra & Narayan, 2011; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a) .
According to the attendant literature, applied econometrics that proceeds from sound intuition is a useful scientific activity. As substantiated throughout this introduction, the intuition underlying this research is simple to follow: existing levels of inequality affect the role of governance in promoting gender economic participation. Hence, it is relevant to assess maximum levels of inequality at which, good governance no longer promotes female economic inclusion.
It is worthwhile to further substantiate the intuition for the study by providing clarifications to two more tendencies motivating this study, notably: that economic inequality can affect governance structures and economic inequality can also affect the participation of women in the formal economic sector. Accordingly, the attendant literature is consistent on the position that the responsiveness of government-tailored inclusive policies to economic prosperity is hampered by existing levels of income inequality. To put this intuition into more perspective: "The study finds that the responsiveness of poverty to income is a decreasing function of inequality" (Fosu, 2010b, p. 818) ; "The responsiveness of poverty to income is a decreasing function of inequality, and the inequality elasticity of poverty is actually larger than the income elasticity of poverty" (Fosu, 2010c (Fosu, , p. 1432 ; and "In general, high initial levels of inequality limit the effectiveness of growth in reducing poverty while growing inequality increases poverty directly for a given level of growth" (Fosu, 2011, p. 11) . These conclusions from Fosu are relevant in motivating the study because income-driven policies from governments are designed to ultimately promote inclusive development.
In light of the above, the corresponding research question this study aims to answer is the following: what levels or thresholds of inequality completely nullify the positive incidence of governance on female economic inclusion? Two hypothetical premises are necessary to answer the question, notably: governance should positively affect inclusive economic participation while the interaction between governance and inequality should have the opposite effect.
Hypothesis 1: there are positive unconditional effects from the incidence of governance on female economic inclusion.
Hypothesis 2: there are negative conditional effects from the interaction between governance and inequality on female economic inclusion.
The underlying hypotheses are partly supported with stylized facts on the nexuses between inequality (i.e. the Gini coefficient) and the dynamics of female economic participation.
Accordingly, as apparent in Figure 1 from the left to the right, while the relationship between inequality and female economic participation is not very apparent (i.e. first graph): (i) there is a positive nexus between inequality and female unemployment (i.e. second graph) and (ii) a negative nexus between inequality and female employment (i.e. third graph).
The rest of the research is organised in the following manner. Section 2 covers the data and methodology whilst the empirical findings are presented and discussed in section 3. The study concludes in section 4 with implications and future research directions. Fourth, two main control variables are adopted from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank, namely: mobile phone penetration and remittances. These indicators are motivated by contemporary African inclusive development literature (Efobi et al., 2018; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2018; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2018b; Tchamou et al., 2019) . The expected signs are contingent on country-specific effects that are not considered in the estimation exercise because the adopted GMM approach is designed such that country-specific effects are eliminated in order to prevent the concern of endogeneity which results from the correlation between the lagged outcome variable and country-specific effects. However, in accordance with the attendant empirical literature, mobile phone penetration is expected to increase female labour force participation and female employment while it is also anticipated to decrease female unemployment. Concerning remittances, Meniago and Asongu (2018) have recently established that they increase inequality in Africa because majority of the population moving abroad from the continent are from rich households. Consequently, when funds are remitted to Africa, these funds end-up improving the financial standing of rich households, ceteris paribus. The narrative on inequality has been confirmed within the framework of female exclusion by Asongu and Odhiambo (2018a) .
Concerns may arise as to why variables in the conditioning information set are limited to two. It is worthwhile to note that, such restriction of elements in the conditioning information set in order to avoid concerns of instrument proliferation is not uncommon in the empirical literature, in so far as the motivation for such restriction is to obtain valid models and robust coefficients.
Cases in GMM-centric literature that are relevant in substantiating this perspective include: (i) Bruno, De Bonis and Silvestrini (2012) who have used two control variables as in this study and
(ii) Osabuohien and Efobi (2013) and Asongu and Nwachukwu (2017) who have not used any control variable. The definitions and sources of variables are provided in Appendix 1 whereas the summary statistics is disclosed in Appendix 2. The correlation matrix is covered in Appendix 3.
Methodology
GMM Specification
Borrowing from recent GMM-centric literature, the GMM empirical approach is adopted for this study because of four main fundamental factors (Meniago & Asongu, 2018; Tchamyou, 2019a Tchamyou, , 2019b Tchamyou et al., 2019; Agoba, Abor, Osei, & Sa-Aadu, 2019; Fosu & Abass, 2019) . (i) In this research, the number of sampled countries (i.e. N) far exceeds the number of periods in each cross section (i.e. T). Hence, the N>T condition warranted for the employment of the strategy is met.
(ii) Persistence is exhibited by the outcome variables of female economic inclusion because the correlations between first lag and level series' are higher than 0.800 which is the rule of thumb threshold for confirming persistence in a variable (Asongu & Odhiambo, 2019b , 2019c . (iii) The panel data strucure of the research informs the study that cross-country differences are taken on board in the estimations. (iv) The concern of endogeneity is also addressed by the study because, on the one hand, reverse causality or simultaneity is tackled with the use of internal instruments and on the other; the unobserved heterogeneity is controlled by means of time-invariant omitted indicators.
The GMM approach adopted in this study is the Roodman (2009a Roodman ( , 2009b ) strategy which has been documented to limit the proliferation of instruments. The following equations in level (1) and first difference (2) summarise the standard system GMM estimation procedure.
where,
FE , is an indicator of gender economic inclusion (i.e. female labour force participation, female unemployment rate and female employment rate) of country i in period t , 0  is a constant, G entails governance (political stability, "voice & accountability", regulatory quality, government effectiveness, rule of law and corruption-control), I denotes the income inequality indicator or the Gini coefficient, GI reflects interactions between governance and inequality indicators ("political stability" × "the Gini coefficient"; "voice & accountability" × "the Gini coefficient"; "regulatory quality"×"the Gini coefficient";"government effectiveness" × "the Gini coefficient"; "the rule of law"×"the Gini coefficient" and "corruption-control"× "the Gini coefficient"), M is mobile phone penetration, R is remittances, represents the coefficient of autoregression which is one within the framework of this study because a year lag appropriately captures past information, t  is the time-specific constant, i  is the country-specific effect and t i,  the error term.
Identification and exclusion restrictions
For a robust GMM specification, it is relevant to articulate the identification strategy as well as the exclusion restrictions that underpin the identification approach. This research is in accordance with contemporary GMM-centric literature in considering years as strictly exogenous and the independent variables (i.e. governance channels, inequality policy syndrome and control indicators) are predetermined or endogenous explaining (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016c; Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017; Boateng et al., 2018; Tchamyou et al., 2019) . Roodman (2009b) also argues in favour of this strategy by maintaining that years cannot become endogenous in a difference series 7 .
In light of the explanation above, the identification and exclusion restrictions are assessed on the basis of the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for instrument exogeneity. The alternative hypothesis of this test is the position that the instruments are not exogenous whereas the corresponding null hypothesis is the stance that such instruments exhibit strict exogeneity.
Therefore, in the findings that are reported in the empirical section, for this exclusion restriction assumption to hold, the null hypothesis of the DHT should not be rejected. The clarifications on identification and exclusion restrictions pertaining to validating the adopted instruments is not different from the criterion in traditional instrumental variable (IV) techniques which require that the null hypothesis of the Sargan/Hansen test should not be rejected in order for the instruments to be valid (Beck,Demirgüç-Kunt& Levine, 2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016d) .
Empirical results
Presentation of results
This section discloses the regressions results in Tables 1-3. Table 1 focuses on the nexus between inequality, governance and female labour force participation while Table 2 is concerned with linkages between inequality, governance and female unemployment. Table 3 focuses and (iii) the rule of law and corruption-control (in the third category for institutional governance).
Four information criteria are used to examine the validity of estimated models 8 . In the light of these criteria, specifications in the 3 rd and 4 th columns of Table 2 are invalid. The invalidity 7 Hence, the procedure for treating ivstyle (years) is 'iv (years, eq(diff))' whereas the gmmstyle is employed for predetermined variables.
"First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR (2)) in difference for the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen over-identification restrictions (OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections in most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided" (Asongu& De Moor, 2017, p.200).
is essentially based on the fact that the null hypotheses of the Hansen overidentifying restrictions tests are rejected. It is relevant to note that the Hansen test which is more robust than the Sargan test is weakened by the proliferation of instruments. This is not the case with the Sargan test which is not sensitive to instrument proliferation. Hence, an approach through which the underlying conflict of interest is avoided is to adopt the Hansen test and ensure that instrument proliferation is limited. A criterion of limiting instrument proliferation is that instruments should be less than the number of cross sections in each specification.
This research follows the approach of Asongu (2018) in establishing thresholds of inequality that crowd-out the favourable impact of good governance on female economic inclusion. For instance in the last column of Table 1 , the maximum value of inequality at which corruption-control positively affects female labour force participation 0.550 (2.559/4.646). In this computation, 2.559 is the unconditional effect of corruption-control on female labour force participation while 4.646 is the absolute value of the conditional effect from the interaction between corruption-control and the Gini coefficient. Hence, above a Gini coefficient threshold of 0.550, the Gini coefficient completely crowds-out the positive unconditional effect of corruptioncontrol (i.e. 2.556) on female labour force participation.
The following findings can be established from Tables 1-3 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests; and b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests.The mean value of the Gini coefficient is 0.586.na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for the computation of the net effects is not significant.Constants are included in all regressions. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests; and b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests.The mean value of the Gini coefficient is 0.586. na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient neededfor the computation of the net effects is not significant. Constants are included in all regressions.
Further discussion of results
The research question motivating this study has centred on the assessment of the levels of income inequality that reduce the effectiveness of governance in tailoring conducive policies that ultimately promote the participation of more women in the formal economic sector. In order to make this assessment, two main hypotheses have been tested. The empirical findings have largely validated the tested hypotheses because: (i) governance standards unconditionally increase female participation in the labour force and female employment (i.e. in Table 1 and Table 3 ) and also unconditionally decrease female unemployment (i.e. Table 2 ). The positive unconditional effect of governance validates Hypothesis 1. (ii) As for Hypothesis 2, it is apparent that income inequality interacts with governance to reduce female participation in the labour force and female employment (i.e. in Table 1 and Table 3 ) and also increase female unemployment (i.e. Table 2 ).
This negative conditional effect thus validates Hypothesis 2.
The validation of the tested hypotheses is broadly consistent with the literature supporting the perspective that government-led actions that are designed to boost economic development in view of increasing inclusive development can be attenuated by the existing level of income inequality (Fosu, 2008 (Fosu, , 2009 (Fosu, , 2010a (Fosu, , 2015 Tchamyou, 2019c; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2018) are some studies broadly supporting the validated hypotheses. The corresponding policy implications are discussed in the concluding section.
Concluding implications and future research directions
The study assesses critical thresholds of inequality at which good governance is no longer relevant It is important for policy makers to, therefore, limit inequality because such reduction will not only boost the participation of women in the formal economic sector but will also enhance the negative response of extreme poverty to economic growth in the post-2015 sustainable development agenda in SSA. This inference is consistent with the premise of this research -which is that the effectiveness of governance in promoting inclusive development is hampered by existing levels of income inequality. It is relevant to recall that about half of countries in the subregion failed to attain the MDG extreme poverty target in spite of the sub-region having experienced more than two decades of growth resurgence. Hence, reduction of income inequality will not exclusively contribute towards the achievement of the SDGs motivating this study, notably: (i) SDG 5 (i.e. "achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls") and (ii) SDG 8 (i.e. "promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all"). Moreover, policies designed to promote gender economic participation also have externalities in the structural distribution of labour, reduction of poverty and improvement in the general welfare. In a nutshell, these will go a long way to addressing most poverty-and inequality-related SDGs in the sub-region.
Future studies can improve the extant literature by assessing the established findings within country-specific frameworks in order to provide room for more targeted policy implications. It is also worthwhile to clarify that the GMM approach used in this study is designed to eliminate country-specific effects in order to avoid a correlation between the lagged dependent variable and such country-specific effects which is a cause of endogeneity. Another caveat is that the Gini coefficient which, is used to measure income inequality because of its wide usage in the literature, has the shortcoming of not capturing tails or extreme points of the inequality distribution. Hence, it would be worthwhile for future studies to take on board measures of inequality that are sensitive to outliers of inequality, inter alia: the Atkinson index and the Palma ratio. 
